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‘Nothing	will	ever	be	the	same	again’.	Personal	
commitment	and	political	subjectivation	in	the	20	
February	Movement	in	Morocco	 
Francesco	Vacchiano	&	Hafsa	Afailal	 Instituto	de	Ciências	Sociais,	Universidade	de	Lisboa,	Lisbon,	Portugal	 	ABSTRACT	 Based	on	an	analysis	of	the	stories	of	engagement	of	young	activists	who	took	part	in	the	20	February	Movement	in	Morocco,	this	contribution	explores	the	process	of	individual	transformation	that	occurred	during	the	experience	of	activism.	We	use	the	concept	of	political	subjectivation	to	discuss	the	succession	of	moments	of	rupture	and	re-semanticisation,	the	new	ethical	configurations	generated	by	the	experience	of	activism	and	their	long-term	consequences.	This	contribution	is	part	of	an	ethnographic	study	that	has	accompanied	the	evolution	of	the	protests	from	2011,	carried	out	by	the	two	authors	first	independently	and,	from	2017,	within	the	framework	of	the	‘Globally	Sensitive:	Revolt,	Citizenship,	and	Expectations	for	the	Future	in	North	Africa’	project.	 KEYWORDS:	Morocco;	20	February	Movement;	activism;	political	subjectivation	 	
We	need	the	formation	of	this	insurrectional	
collective	subjectivity	for	which	what	was	bearable	
becomes	unbearable	[...]	 	
How	do	these	‘same’	become	others?	What	is	this	
transformative	energy	by	which	‘I’,	‘We’	are	no	
longer	as	before?		Fethi	Benslama,	Soudain	la	Révolution!	 	Introduction	 The	 popular	 uprisings	 of	 2011,	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Arab	 Spring’,	 have	 probably	 constituted	 the	 most	substantial	 topic	 in	 scholarship	dedicated	 to	 the	Middle	East	 and	North	Africa	over	 the	 last	 years.	The	events	preceding	 and	 following	 the	 self-immolation	 of	 Tāriq	Muhammad	Al-Bou	 ‘Azizi	 have	 been	 scrutinised	 from	 a	variety	of	perspectives	and	their	ambiguous	outcomes	are	still	the	subject	of	intense	debate.	Numerous	analyses	have	pointed	to	the	combination	of	state	authoritarianism	and	cronyism	as	providing	fertile	ground	for	the	revolts	(Hibou	 2006,	 2011;	 Campante	 and	 Chor	 2012;	 Bayart	 2013;	 Bono	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Authors	 have	 particularly	emphasised	how,	in	the	last	thirty	years,	the	traditional	strategies	of	power	and	resource	accumulation	have	been	reformulated	 within	 a	 new	 neo-liberal	 agenda,	 enlarging	 the	 gap	 between	 classes	 and	 furthering	 a	 sense	 of	immobility	 and	 frustration	 in	 society	 (King	2007;	Bogaert	2013;	Almodóvar	2014;	Hanieh	2013;	Akçali	 2016;	Bogaert	 2018).	 The	 condition	 of	 youth	 has	 been	 pivotal	 in	 these	 analyses,	 owing	 both	 to	 young	 people’s	representativeness	in	society	and	to	their	protracted	‘waithood’	in	the	delayed	process	of	generational	transition	(Dhillon,	 Dyer,	 and	 Yousef	 2009;	 Osman	 2012;	Murphy	 2012;	 Honwana	 2013;	Muldering	 2013;	 Shafer	 2015;	Belghazi	and	Moudden	2015).	Several	authors	agree	in	identifying	Middle	Eastern	youth	as	a	historically	specific	‘sociological	generation’,	marked	by	cultural	experiences	and	ambitions	that	are	relatively	distinct	from	the	past	(Desrues	2012;	Murphy	2012;	Gertel	2017).	 Against	this	backdrop,	the	combination	of	capitalistic	pressures	for	accumulation	and	self-improvement,	together	with	the	reality	of	uneven	opportunities	at	home	has	motivated	young	–	and	often	very	young	–	people	of	lower	classes	to	pursue	a	possible	future	in	a	coveted	and	distant	elsewhere	(Vacchiano	2014,	2018a).	This	happened	before,	after	and	also	during	the	days	of	the	revolt	(Tazzioli	2017).	While	such	factors	are	commonly	evoked	to	provide	a	context	for	the	sudden	outburst	of	protests	that	occurred	in	2011,	numerous	authors	have	discussed	the	
conditions	that	precipitated	the	events,	some	emphasising	the	unleashing	effect	of	social	media,	and	others	the	role	of	grass-roots	organisations	in	laying	the	ground	for	revolt.	 Each	of	these	contributions	sheds	partial	light	on	the	events.	Yet,	they	mostly	explore	the	historical,	political	and	social	dynamics	underlying	popular	discontent.	Whereas	structural	 factors	are	certainly	relevant,	 they	are	not	sufficient	per	se	to	explain	people’s	disposition	to	take	an	active	role	in	mobilisations.	In	point	of	fact,	very	few	scholars	have	as	yet	tried	to	include	subjects’	choices	and	intimate	motivations	in	their	attempts	to	understand	the	2011	revolts	(see	examples	in	Abdelrahman	2011	and	Benslama	2011).	In	this	contribution	we	try	to	retain	a	sense	 of	 the	 societal	 factors	 behind	 the	 2011	 uprisings	while	 giving	 attention	 to	 the	 individuals	 involved,	 by	exploring	the	ways	in	which	people	decided	to	step	forward	and	make	a	personal	commitment	to	political	change.	By	foregrounding	figures,	we	do	not	mean	to	disregard	the	background,	but	instead	to	study	their	interdependence	and	explore	how	circumstances	influence	choices	and,	 in	turn,	how	people	concur	in	producing	events.	For,	as	compelling	as	a	collective	moment	might	be	for	those	participating	in	it,	such	events	are	also	made	by	and	through	personal	stories.	 The	idea	of	exploring	the	2011	uprisings	from	this	angle	came	from	our	conversations	with	Moroccan	activists,	in	which	they	generally	agree	that	the	results	of	the	wave	of	demonstrations	that	occurred	in	2011	lie	well	below	expectations.	Yet,	they	also	recurrently	remark	that,	despite	their	disappointment,	‘nothing	will	ever	be	the	same	again’.	Now,	we	could	easily	dismiss	this	statement	as	a	case	of	‘cognitive	dissonance’	(the	need	to	justify	personal	engagement	in	terms	of	rationality	and	success),	a	framework	that	would	also	explain	why	activists	are	usually	more	prone	to	give	a	positive	assessment	of	the	events	(Festinger	1957).	However,	if	we	really	want	to	grasp	the	subjective	meaning	 of	 the	 experience,	we	 are	 called	 upon	 to	 take	 this	 statement	 seriously	 and	 ask:	what	 has	allegedly	 changed	 forever?	 If	 the	 common,	 widespread	 perception	 of	 the	 events	 that	 unfolded	 after	 the	 self-sacrifice	of	Bou	‘Azizi	is	one	of	disillusionment,	what	do	protagonists	think	has	been,	nonetheless,	permanently	achieved?	 By	spotlighting	 individual	decision,	we	aim	to	observe	the	ways	 in	which	one	comes	to	undertake	a	politically	informed	process	of	reflection	and	choice.	As	we	will	see,	 this	does	not	mean	that	people	are	necessarily	 fully	aware	of	their	reasons	for	(or	the	consequences	of)	their	actions,	but	that,	given	a	certain	combination	of	historical	dynamics	and	events,	they	can	assume	new	forms	of	positioning	as	a	result	of	a	subjective	shift.	While	there	is	a	long	tradition	of	studies	concerning	‘daily	resistance’	and	‘tactics’	(De	Certeau	1990),	‘infra-politics’	and	‘hidden	transcripts’	(Scott	1985,	1990)	and	‘non-movements’	(Bayat	2010),	it	seems	to	us	that	much	less	has	been	written	about	the	moments	in	which	people	stop	resisting	and	start	revolting	(Thomassen	2012).	 Young	 people	 are	 at	 the	 core	 of	 our	 analysis.	 However,	 youth	 is	 not	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 age,	 but	 a	 category	characterised	by	a	peculiar	federative	quality,	one	that	allows	people	of	different	ages	and	walks	of	life	to	imagine,	if	not	a	common	programme,	at	least	a	common	condition.	In	our	discussion,	it	is	pertinent	mainly	as	an	‘emic’	concept,	owing	to	the	fact	that	our	interlocutors	liked	to	use	it	to	imagine	themselves	in	relation	to	their	world.	 This	contribution	results	from	ethnographic	work	started	in	2011	and	carried	out	by	the	two	authors	in	Morocco	and	Tunisia,	 first	 separately	 and,	 from	2017,	under	 the	 common	 framework	of	 the	 ‘Globally	 Sensitive:	Revolt,	Citizenship,	and	Expectations	for	the	Future	in	North	Africa’	research	project,	funded	by	the	Portuguese	Council	for	Scientific	Research.1	We	met	and,	whenever	possible,	interviewed	young	activists	who	participated	in	the	20	February	Movement	in	Morocco,	in	order	to	explore	with	them	their	paths	of	engagement	during	and	after	2011.	Additionally,	we	recovered	some	of	the	interviews	carried	out	by	Hafsa	Afailal	for	the	realisation	of	the	volume	‘20	February	Movement.	 An	Attempt	 of	Documentation’,	 published	 in	Arabic	 by	 the	Mediator	 for	Democracy	 and	Human	Rights.2	Our	goal	was	to	explore	the	subjective	transformations	related	to	their	experience	of	activism.	We	use	the	concept	of	‘political	subjectivation’	as	a	tool	that	allows	us	to	think,	as	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	the	succession	of	moments	of	rupture	and	re-semanticisation,	the	elaboration	of	new	worldviews	and	new	ethical	configurations	related	to	the	experience	of	political	engagement,	as	well	as	their	long-term	consequences.			Political	subjectivation,	or	a	theory	of	freedom	 In	our	analysis,	we	propose	to	use	the	concept	of	 ‘political	subjectivation’	to	describe	the	process	of	individual	transformation	related	to	the	experiences	in	which	a	new	ethical	orientation,	a	new	representation	of	oneself	and	the	world	and	a	new	propensity	for	engagement	and	action	emerge.	In	our	understanding,	the	concept	includes	that	of	‘political	socialization’	insofar	as	it	considers	the	importance	of	primary	and	secondary	relations	for	the	maturation	of	ethical	and	political	values	(Petrovic,	van	Stekelenburg,	and	Klandermans	2014).	On	the	one	hand,	we	wish	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	our	interlocutors	came	to	the	decision	to	act.	On	the	other	hand,	we	analyse	the	aftermaths	of	their	choices	and	their	consequences	in	the	long	run.	 In	a	perspective	that	intersects	psychoanalysis	and	poststructuralist	anthropology,	we	consider	subjectivation	as	the	endless	process	in	which	we	become	particular	individuals	through	our	relationship	with	other	people,	objects	
and	physical	spaces	that	impose	an	embodied	order	of	values	and	meanings.3	Such	an	order,	incorporated	mostly	through	 sensations	 and	 affects	 and,	 therefore,	 largely	 unconscious,	 constitutes	 a	 relatively	 predictable	 set	 of	orientations,	 according	 to	 which	 an	 individual	 complies	 with	 and	 reacts	 to	 the	 world.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	multiplicity	of	forms	of	being	and	living	in	the	world	and	the	ontogenic	nature	of	human	experience,	this	largely	unacknowledged	 set	 of	 values	 and	meanings	 is	 neither	 coherent	 nor	 permanent,	 and	 –	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 –	responds	to	circumstances	and	changes	over	time.	 For	us,	subjectivation	is	therefore	the	process	in	which	individuals,	striving	to	define	themselves	in	relation	to	the	world	and	their	experience	of	it,	elaborate	new	affective	and	cognitive	repertoires	in	order	to	orient	their	action	amidst	a	series	of	possible	alternatives.	In	our	analysis,	subjectivation	is	‘political’	when	personal	change	emerges	in	a	process	in	which	a	specific	vision	of	society	and	collective	future	is	intentionally	pursued.	 The	 notion	 of	 political	 subjectivation	 has	 been	 largely	 employed	 in	 political	 philosophy,	 although	 not	 always	consistently	and,	at	times,	without	a	clear	theorisation	of	how	exactly	the	subject	should	be	conceptualized.	This	long	 genealogy,	 which	 goes	 from	 Arendt	 to	 Rancière	 via	 Foucault,	 Butler,	 Laclau,	 Deleuze,	 Zm ižek	 and	 others	(recently	examined	by	Tassin	2012	and	Tarragoni	2016),	focuses	specifically	on	the	process	of	transformation	that	is	induced	by	experience	and	its	potentialities	for	political	change.	Despite	differences,	these	authors	agree	that	subjectivation	is	an	unfinished	process	of	differentiation	and,	as	such,	an	opening	to	a	condition	of	uncertainty.	For	Hannah	 Arendt,	 the	 subject	 is	 not	 obliged	 by	 his	 past	 but	must	 constantly	 invent	 it	 through	 a	movement	 of	singularisation	that	makes	one	‘other’	and	which	is	political	in	the	first	place	(Arendt	1958).	 This	reflection	finds	an	echo	in	Foucault’s	later	works,	in	which	subjectivation	is	described	as	a	process	that	is	concurrently	a	subjection	to	practices	of	sovereignty	and	a	productive	possibility	of	difference.	For	Foucault,	and	for	Butler	thereafter,	subjection/subjectivation	takes	on	political	qualities	when	the	individuals	are	transformed	into	the	subjects	of	their	own	practice	(Foucault	1984;	Butler	1997).	The	act	of	‘taking	care	of	oneself’	carries	a	series	of	political	implications	insofar	as	it	both	accomplishes	and	transforms	the	bio-power.	Through	a	series	of	‘limit	experiences’	(‘experiences-limite’,	an	expression	borrowed	from	Blanchot	regarding	experiences	that	lie	out	of	the	ordinary),	the	subject	carries	out	a	self-denial	and	a	self-invention	(Foucault	1986).	The	techniques	of	the	self	are	operations	based	on	a	reasoning	about	the	beautiful,	the	good,	the	just	and	so	on	whereby	the	individual	is	transformed	into	an	ethical	subject	(Foucault	1988),	that	is,	one	who	is	able	to	use	the	power	‘for	other	purposes’	(Olivier	 1996,	 67).	 Although	 Foucault	mostly	 does	 not	 clarify	 in	which	 sense	 this	 process	 can	 be	 considered	properly	 political,	 we	 retain	 in	 this	 idea	 the	 transformative	 potentiality	 of	 the	 act	 of	 reflection	 on	 and	problematisation	of	the	existing.	 The	 subject	 that	 emerges	 out	 of	 this	 process	 is	 neither	 a	 polished	 nor	 a	 finished	 product,	 but	 a	 set	 of	 new	contradictory	potentialities.	The	 author	who	most	 insists	 on	 this	 ‘negative’	 aspect	 of	 subjectivation	 is	 Jacques	Rancière,	for	whom	politics	is	first	and	foremost	a	‘rupture’	(‘désidentification’)	that	makes	it	possible	to	undo	the	reproductive	classifications	of	the	social	order	(Rancière	1995).	Rancière’s	subject	is	realised	only	in	its	making,	when	it	is	able	to	remain	‘outsider’	or	‘in-between’	(Rancière	1995,	61),	and	political	subjectivation	is	produced	mainly	 through	 the	 rejection	 of	 a	 ‘remarkable	 subject’	 and	 the	 pursuit	 of	 an	 ‘indeterminate	 future	 without	precession	or	procession’	(Fjeld	and	Tassin	2015).	In	Rancière,	political	subjectivation	is	not	the	coming	to	a	state	(he	calls	it	‘police’),	but	an	opening	to	new	and	unknown	sets	of	possibilities:	‘a	multiple	that	was	not	given	in	the	police	constitution	of	the	community’	(Rancière	1995,	60).	In	short,	it	is	a	‘break’	loaded	with	potentialities	and	unexpected	consequences	(see	also	Zm ižek	2013).	 The	 contributions	 of	 this	 long	 tradition	 in	 political	 philosophy	 emphasise	 the	 necessity	 of	 considering	 the	individual	(and	his/her	personal	transformations)	as	a	 fundamental	player	 in	the	dynamics	of	political	change	(Tarragoni	2014).	On	the	one	hand,	we	take	inspiration	from	them	to	postulate	that	political	action	is	possibly	the	result	of	a	reasoning	in	which	the	subject	is	constituted	through	a	process	or	cognitive	and	affective	reformulation.	On	the	other	hand,	we	consider	that,	in	much	of	this	scholarship	(Laclau	2005;	Hardt	and	Negri	2005),	political	organisation	takes	second	place,	and	politics	appears	mostly	as	the	action	of	a	plurality	of	individuals.	Indeed,	as	also	 emerges	 in	 our	 analysis,	 individuals	 are	 transformed	 primarily	 through	 their	 socialisation	 within	 a	community,	commonly	consisting	of	organised	or	semi-organised	groups.	For	us,	focusing	on	the	individual	and	his/her	personal	motives	does	not	mean	that	political	subjectivation	is	an	inner	monologue.	Personal	sensibility	is	converted	into	a	political	–	that	is,	collective	–	project	mainly	through	the	relation	with	forms	of	shared	thought.	 Despite	their	lack	of	specific	reflections	on	the	forms	of	organisation	and	their	structuring	impact	on	the	subject,	these	authors	remain	relevant	because	they	make	it	possible	to	think	of	political	action	as	the	result	of	a	process	that	promotes	‘work	on	oneself’.	Such	work	consists	of	a	major	ethical	shift	and,	as	such,	can	be	analysed	through	the	lenses	of	a	rather	different	field	of	studies	that	has	emerged	in	anthropology	in	recent	years	and	is	dedicated	to	the	theorisation	of	ethics,	morality	and	freedom.	Although	an	extensive	examination	of	this	vast	and	growing	literature	is	beyond	this	article’s	scope,	we	draw	from	it	some	valuable	hints.	Much	of	this	new	scholarship	stands	out	against	a	Durkheimian,	social-deterministic	view	of	society,	opposing	in	particular	the	equivalence	between	
social	norms	and	morality	in	order	to	carve	out	an	area	of	autonomy	for	the	subject	and	make	personal	freedom	thinkable	(Laidlaw	2002;	Widlok	2004;	Zigon	2008;	Yan	2011).	Significantly,	most	of	these	authors	refer	to	the	Foucauldian	theorisation	on	subjectivation	as	the	foundation	of	the	possibility	for	free	choice	and	liberty.	James	Laidlaw,	for	example,	cites	Foucault’s	definition	of	‘techniques	of	the	self’	to	underline	how	people’s	operations	on	‘their	own	bodies,	their	own	thoughts,	their	own	souls	and	their	own	conduct’	presuppose	an	ethical	project	aimed	at	making	oneself	a	specific	kind	of	person	(Laidlaw	2002,	322).	In	such	practices,	freedom	is	‘exercised’	in	forms	that	 are	both	bound	 to	historically	 available	possibilities	 and	open	 to	new	potentialities	 (Foucault	1984).	 For	Laidlaw	‘wherever	and	in	so	far	as	people’s	conduct	is	shaped	by	attempts	to	make	of	themselves	a	certain	kind	of	person,	because	it	is	as	such	a	person	that,	on	reflection,	they	think	they	ought	to	live,	to	that	extent	their	conduct	is	ethical	and	free’	(Laidlaw	2002,	327).	In	a	similar	vein,	Joel	Robbins	suggests	that	we	consider	all	actions	that	derive	from	a	conscious	thinking	about	oneself	and	the	world	as	properly	‘moral’	(Robbins	2007).	This	point	is	echoed	by	Jarret	Zigon,	who	elaborates	a	sound	distinction	between	‘morality’,	a	practice	rooted	in	non-reflexive	and	unintentional	dispositions,	and	‘ethics’,	a	specific	reflection	on	oneself	and	the	circumstances.	He	draws	from	Heidegger	 a	 notion	 commonly	 translated	 into	 English	 as	 ‘breakdown’	 –	 in	 German	 it	 is	 ‘einer	 Defizienz	 des	
besorgenden	Zu-tun-habens	mit	der	Welt’	(Heidegger	2006,	61)	–	to	describe	the	situations	in	which	the	usual	order	of	things,	the	one	characterised	by	non-reflexive	behaviours	dictated	by	habit,	is	shaken	by	an	interrogation	that	allows	one	to	question	values	and	meanings	(Zigon	2007).	He	calls	‘moral	breakdown’	the	circumstances	in	which	‘ethical	dilemmas’	arise	and	demand	to	 take	a	stand.	The	author	emphasises	 the	affinity	with	 the	Foucauldian	concept	of	 ‘problematization’,	very	relevant	 to	our	reflection	 insofar	as	Foucault	himself	defined	 this	 reflexive	moment	as	an	act	of	freedom.	For	Zigon,	this	‘ethical	moment’	is	not	solipsism,	but	a	relational	move	that	responds	to	a	social	demand.	It	is	also	a	moment	of	freedom	in	which	‘people	work	on	themselves,	and	in	so	doing,	alter	their	very	way	of	being-in-the-world’	(Zigon	2007,	138).	 Here	again,	by	insisting	on	personal	self-reflection,	these	authors	give	the	impression	that	they	prefer	to	limit	the	potentialities	 of	 ethical	 reconfiguration	 to	 the	 individual.	 However,	 it	 seems	 to	 us	 that	 the	 notions	 of	 ‘moral	breakdown’	and	‘problematization’	open	up	interesting	avenues	toward	an	understanding	of	what	kind	of	moves	are	 at	 play	 in	 the	 process	 of	 political	 subjectivation.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 in	 a	 while,	 self-reflection	 and	 ethical	reconfiguration	 constitute	 marking	 moments	 in	 the	 experiences	 of	 political	 engagement.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 our	interlocutors,	a	proper	‘ethical	rupture’,	in	the	sense	proposed	by	Zigon,	was	at	play,	and	was	encouraged	by	the	events	and	by	the	imaginary	possibilities	they	disclosed.	 Through	the	ethical	break	that	accompanies	activism	(and	its	related	experiences	of	estrangement	and	affiliation),	the	subject	realises	a	form	of	life	that	asserts	itself	as	an	example	of	‘another	possible	world’.	This	experience	of	freedom,	realised	in	a	suspended	time	that	would	remind	many	anthropologists	of	the	liminal	condition	of	the	ritual	described	by	Van	Gennep	(1909)	and	reworked	by	Turner	(1969),	lasts	until	a	new	order	imposes	a	return	to	the	‘unreflective	moral	dispositions	of	everyday	life’	(Zigon	2007,	135).	In	the	meantime,	many	things	happen	until,	eventually,	‘nothing	will	ever	be	the	same	again’.	 	A	‘Movement’	in	the	proper	sense	of	the	term	 The	narratives	of	our	Moroccan	interlocutors	–	interviewed	with	the	aim	of	reconstructing	their	personal	paths	to	commitment	–	show	recurrently	how	the	new	circumstances	resulting	from	the	outbursts	of	popular	rage	in	other	countries	unleashed	a	specific	interrogation	about	their	own	condition,	identity	and	role	in	the	‘hot	days’	of	early	2011.4	Such	moments	of	 ‘recognition’	rested	on	a	 feeling	of	commonality	produced	by	the	underlying	sense	of	common	identity	and	opposition	to	injustice.	The	exemplum	coming	from	elsewhere	represented	for	many	of	them	a	powerful	driver	for	a	possible	transition	from	everyday	indignation	to	collective	action.	In	addition,	those	who	had	 previous	 experiences	 of	 militancy,	 either	 personally	 or	 within	 their	 household,	 emphasise	 how	 the	circumstances	imposed	a	new	kind	of	reasoning	about	conditions	and	possibilities,	one	which	had	the	potential	to	trigger	a	process	of	personal	transformation.	 Redwan,	a	young	man	from	Rabat	with	a	mild	interest	in	politics	and	no	previous	experience	of	activism,	admitted	he	was	deeply	impressed	when	the	Tunisian	President	Ben	‘Ali	fled	his	country	on	14	January	2011.	He	calls	it	‘a	turning	point,	the	beginning	of	a	new	phase’.	He	started	to	join	some	friends	at	a	café	to	follow	the	event	on	Al	Jazeera.	He	used	social	networks	to	get	in	touch	with	‘dozens	of	schoolmates’	and	receive	updates.	When	he	was	directed	to	an	event	planned	for	20	February	he	did	not	understand	‘who	they	are’	but	decided,	together	with	his	friends,	to	show	up	on	that	day.	He	began	to	join	meetings	and	take	an	increasingly	active	role	in	the	organisation	of	rallies	and	other	events.	Redwan’s	narrative	emphasises	his	personal	shift	from	the	sense	of	helplessness	that,	according	 to	 his	 words,	 characterised	 the	 past	 and	 his	 investment	 in	 new	 collective	 hopes.	 The	 step	 from	‘subjection’	to	‘participation’	(Almond	and	Verba	1963)	constituted	a	major	subjective	movement,	sustained	by	new	forms	of	political	imagination,	new	languages	and	new	opportunities	for	recognition.	Nevertheless,	for	our	
interlocutors,	this	is	rarely	a	passage	from	nothing	to	all,	but	is	more	often	a	progression	across	different	forms	of	feeling	and	thinking	the	world.	 Sukaina	gradually	moved	closer	 to	politics	 in	2008,	after	 joining	a	march	 for	Palestine.	She	had	moved	from	a	shantytown	located	in	the	outskirts	of	a	city	in	the	North	to	Rabat	to	study	journalism	a	few	months	earlier.	Despite	the	humble	conditions	of	her	household,	she	had	always	been	an	excellent	student	and	‘the	hope	of	the	family’	for	a	better	 future,	but	she	had	 to	borrow	money	 from	uncles	 to	be	able	 to	afford	 to	study	away	 from	home.	She	describes	her	environment	as	non-politicised,	one	in	which	people	commonly	reiterated	the	widespread	image	of	the	King	as	 ‘a	hard	worker	surrounded	by	thieves’.	At	various	events	on	free	speech	and	freedom	of	the	press	organised	by	students,	she	came	in	contact	with	the	representatives	of	the	Moroccan	Association	for	Human	Rights	and	 started	 to	 attend	 meetings	 of	 the	 Socialist	 Democratic	 Vanguard	 Party	 (PADS),	 a	 left-wing	 political	organisation.	She	increasingly	questioned	her	upbringing	and	her	values:	‘When	I	arrived	in	Rabat	I	was	a	veiled	girl,	adopting	a	typical	popular	Muslim	religion	but,	as	time	went	on,	my	way	of	thinking	began	to	change’.	She	speaks	of	 ‘a	revolution	against	the	values	and	uses	that	I	had	acquired’,	by	moving	 ‘from	popular	Islam	to	[the	condition	of]	a	young	layman	who	believes	in	difference	and	tolerance,	individual	freedoms,	and	freedom	of	belief’.	Taking	advantage	of	distance,	she	kept	this	change	hidden	from	her	family	for	almost	two	years.	On	20	February	she	gave	an	interview	for	a	national	TV	station	and	went	on	air.	She	considers	that	she	belongs	to	‘the	class	that	had	to	take	to	the	street’,	feeling	‘compelled	to	go	out	to	manifest	and	claim	for	change	and	social	equity’.	For	her,	the	2011	Movement	was	an	‘opportunity	that	should	not	be	missed’,	in	part	because	of	the	favourable	regional	and	international	environment.	 ‘Adil,	a	young	worker	from	Rabat,	concedes	he	was	aware	of	the	existence	of	‘corruption’	(fasād)	in	society,	but	was	passively	accustomed	to	it:	‘That’s	just	the	way	it	is’.	He	half-heartedly	joined	the	rally	on	20	February,	but	realised	the	slogans	chanted	by	the	growing	crowd	were	in	tune	with	his	feelings.	He	kept	on	attending	rallies	without	taking	up	a	more	active	role	within	the	Movement.	According	to	him,	this	attitude	lasted	until	the	day	when	he	was	heavily	beaten	by	the	police	during	a	sit-in.	This	event	‘disclosed	for	the	first	time	a	different	aspect	of	politics’,	becoming	a	marking	episode,	a	turning	point	in	his	militancy,	which	became	more	intense	thereafter.	In	his	testimony,	‘Adil	highlights	his	sense	of	helplessness	in	the	face	of	‘corruption’	and	the	sudden	recognition	of	the	 connection	 between	his	 unarticulated	 feelings	 and	 the	 keywords	 of	 the	Movement.	 For	 him,	 this	move	 of	identification	was	a	first	step	on	the	path	leading	from	private	indignation	to	public	commitment.	Similarly	to	other	activists,	exposure	to	violence	marked	for	him	the	passage	to	a	further	stage.	Violence,	especially	that	which	comes	from	the	makhzen,5	is	often	described	by	activists	as	the	crossing	of	a	new	boundary,	leading	to	a	deeper	awareness	of	the	power	relations	within	society.	Repression	unleashes	its	productive	potential,	contributing	to	materialising	the	contradictions	inherent	in	society	and	make	them	dramatically	concrete.	 Hayat	grew	up	in	Tetouan,	in	a	working	class	neighbourhood	stigmatised	because	of	its	reputation	for	violence	and	religious	extremism.	She	dropped	out	of	school	early	to	work	with	her	family	‘at	the	diwāna’,	a	vernacular	expression	that	alludes	to	the	carriers	of	undeclared	goods	across	the	border	of	Ceuta	(Vacchiano	2013).	On	20	February	she	‘went	downtown’	with	some	neighbours	connected	to	the	Islamist	organisation	Al-‘Adl	wa	al-Ihsān.	She	explains	it	is	not	necessary	to	be	an	activist	‘to	say	no’,	as	everybody	was	‘tired	of	hogra’.6	Although,	as	she	says,	at	home	they	were	rather	used	to	living	‘hda	l-hit’	(flanking	the	wall),	she	is	now	convinced	that	‘people	can	change	 the	 situation’	 (ash-sha‘b	 yemken	 ghayyar	 al-wad‘iya).	 Although	 her	 parents	 are	 worried	 for	 the	consequences	she	might	run	into,	she	knows	that,	in	the	end,	they	know	she	is	right.	 Living	‘hda	l-hit’	means	to	avoid	problems,	especially	with	the	authorities,	to	keep	a	cautious	discretion	and,	most	of	all,	to	refrain	from	protesting.	It	is	an	attitude	of	deference	and	avoidance	that	disguises	the	‘tiredness	of	life’	in	order	to	get	by	under	an	authoritarian	regime	marked	by	heightened	surveillance.	It	is	certainly	a	daily	tactic,	in	the	sense	given	by	De	Certeau,	and	a	‘moral	disposition	of	the	everyday’	in	Zigon’s	sense.	Hayat	felt	an	inclination	for	 a	 particular	 group,	 in	 this	 case	 a	 charismatic	 Islamist	 organisation	 with	 strong	 support	 in	 working	 class	neighbourhoods,	but	her	initial	tendency	was	to	avoid	any	open	affiliation.	The	step	which	led	her	from	‘flanking	the	wall’	to	‘take	to	downtown’,	and	later	on	to	a	more	active	role	within	the	Movement,	was	made	possible,	once	again,	by	joining	other	‘neighbours’	with	whom	she	experienced	the	possibility	of	trespassing	the	usual	social	and	spatial	boundaries.	Significantly,	the	word	commonly	used	by	our	interlocutors	to	allude	to	demonstrations,	the	same	used	by	Hayat	–	khrej,	‘going	out’	–	conveys	this	sense	of	physical	and	psychological	opening.	The	notion	of	sha‘b	(the	people)	–	whose	will	was	affirmed	through	the	famous	slogan	‘ash-sha‘b	yurīd	...	’	(the	people	want	...)	–	works	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 a	 powerful	 collective	 identification.	 The	 awareness	 that	 one	 is	 right	 reinforces	 the	determination	and	prefigures	new	possibilities	with	respect	to	the	roles	within	the	group	of	origin.	 Mohammed	grew	up	in	a	working-class	neighbourhood	in	a	small	Moroccan	town,	where	his	family	moved	shortly	before	his	birth.	His	household’s	political	orientation	was	mildly	conservative	and	his	father	was	a	member	of	a	traditional	brotherhood.	Mohammed	was	not	particularly	interested	in	politics	and	deems	his	early	life	to	have	been	rather	‘normal’.	On	20	February	he	was	17	years	old	and	declared	on	Facebook	his	intention	to	‘stay	home	playing	Playstation’.	He	considered	that	he	‘had	nothing	to	do	with	the	Movement’,	that	it	was	against	the	King	and	
aimed	at	‘destroying	the	system’.	Even	today,	Mohammed	is	not	completely	aware	of	what	made	him	change	of	mind.	He	recalls	he	had	a	chat	over	coffee	with	two	classmates	who	convinced	him	to	attend	a	meeting,	at	which	he	did	not	understand	most	of	the	topics	that	were	addressed.	Yet,	he	was	‘surprised	by	young	people	who	were	goodmannered,	educated,	and	knew	what	they	were	talking	about’.	Inspired	by	their	example,	he	felt	he	wanted	to	 ‘turn	 into	 a	 person	 who	 understands	 things	 differently’.	 He	 repeatedly	 emphasises	 this	 sense	 of	 personal	differentiation,	with	respect	to	his	family,	but	even	more	in	relation	to	the	conformist	way	of	seeing	society	and	politics.	He	took	a	while	before	confessing	to	his	parents	his	militancy,	but	he	feels	his	relationship	with	them	markedly	 improved	 thereafter.	 He	 assertively	 maintains	 that	 being	 part	 of	 the	 Movement	 was	 ‘a	 superb	experience’	that	changed	him,	including	the	direction	of	his	studies	(see	the	next	section).	 A	significant	continuity	between	family	and	activism	emerges	in	many	but,	significantly,	not	all	of	our	interlocutors’	life	stories.	The	family	has	a	fundamental	role,	even	if	not	deterministic,	in	conveying	an	ethical	orientation	toward	the	world	and	a	broad	or	specific	political	vision.	While	this	observation	might	verge	on	truism,	we	can	still	observe	the	quality	of	this	transmission	and	the	way	in	which	family	orientation	is	reshaped	by	new	historical	conditions.	 Kamal	hails	from	a	household	composed	of	activists	who	made	their	firsts	steps	into	politics	in	the	1970s,	among	the	ranks	of	the	Socialist	Union	of	Popular	Forces	(USFP),	and	then	joined	the	Socialist	Democratic	Vanguard	Party	(PADS).	During	childhood	and	early	adolescence,	Kamal	found	it	hard	to	understand	his	parents’	commitment,	which	kept	them	intensely	busy	and	had	even	led	his	father	to	prison	on	one	occasion.	His	political	awareness	rose	at	the	summer	camps	organised	by	the	Moroccan	Association	of	Human	Rights	(AMDH),	which	he	attended	initially	as	an	opportunity	to	spend	time	with	other	kids.	As	time	passed,	he	felt	more	and	more	comfortable	taking	the	floor	on	issues	they	were	used	to	debating	at	home:	‘the	crisis	of	education,	unemployment,	the	condition	of	public	health,	 corruption	 and	 cronyism,	 the	 separation	 of	 powers,	 the	 monarchy’.	 Logically	 enough,	 he	 feels	 his	involvement	within	the	Movement	from	the	outset	was	the	natural	continuation	of	his	political	socialisation.	And	yet,	he	considers	that,	despite	pushing	him	to	attend	summer	camps,	his	parents’	imprinting	on	his	worldview	has	been	less	influential	than	that	of	his	peers	–	proof	of	which	can	be	found	in	the	fact	that	his	brothers	and	sisters	are	not	politically	active.	In	addition,	he	maintains	that	the	Movement	is	‘a	space	of	participation,	much	more	open	and	free’	than	the	formal	ways	pursued	by	his	parents,	mostly	through	party	politics.	 Interestingly,	Younes,	who	is	from	a	family	largely	affiliated	to	the	Islamist	group	Al-‘Adl	wa	al-Ihsān,	also	feels	the	need	to	underline	his	personal	choice	in	relation	to	politics,	stating	repeatedly	that	he	was	left	free	to	form	his	own	ideas	within	the	household.	Yet,	he	acknowledges	that	his	whole	family	took	part	to	the	rallies	organised	by	the	Movement	in	Spring	2011,	and	that	they	shared	the	same	views	concerning	the	situation	of	the	country	and	the	need	 for	 an	 Islamist	 turn	 in	Morocco.	He	 states	 that	 he	has	been	 ‘always	 interested	 in	politics’,	 ever	 since	he	watched	the	news	with	his	father	and	listened	to	the	grown-ups	discussing	social	and	political	issues.	Very	early	–	he	says	at	13	–	he	read	some	of	Hassan	Al-Banna’s	and	the	Muslim	Brotherhood’s	pamphlets	he	found	at	home	and	approached	a	Moroccan	Brotherhood-	inspired	group,	Al-Tawhı̄d	wa	al-Islāh.	Right	after	20	February,	after	the	groups’s	declaration	of	allegiance	to	‘the	system’,	he	abandoned	Al-Tawhı̄d	wa	al-Islāh	in	order	to	formally	join	‘the	Jamā‘a’,	the	name	used	by	militants	for	Al-‘Adl	wa	al-Ihsān.	As	a	committed	representative	of	the	organisation,	Younes,	who	was	only	14	at	the	time,	worked	to	establish	a	branch	of	the	20	February	Movement	in	high	schools,	the	‘Movement	of	the	students’	(Haraka	al-Talmadiyya).	After	initial	reluctance,	Younes’s	father	encouraged	him	to	 take	part	 in	demonstrations	and	push	the	 Jamā‘a’s	orientation	at	 the	Movement’s	meetings,	a	mandate	 that	caused	recurrent	conflict	with	the	members	of	other	political	groups.	Allegedly,	this	had	the	effect	of	bolstering	Younes’s	 political	 conviction.	 Six	 years	 after	 the	 events,	 Younes	 is	 more	 active	 than	 ever,	 being	 personally	committed	to	the	radical	project	expressed	by	the	Jamā‘a:	its	‘political	and	educational’	goals,	its	‘organizational	capacity’,	 its	 long-term	strategic	thought	aimed	at	preparing	the	ground	for	the	establishment	of	a	new	khilāfa	(‘caliphate’).	In	particular,	he	stresses	the	‘ethical	behaviour’	of	its	members,	who	‘were	always	in	the	first	row’	and	whose	commitment	‘was	not	enfeebled	by	threats	and	detention’.	He	personally	suffered	police	violence	and	detention	for	his	active	role	in	the	demonstrations	supporting	the	Hirak,	the	movement	that	originated	in	the	Rif	after	the	death	of	Muhsin	Fikri	(Lefèvre	2017;	Wolf	2018),	and	is	now	convinced	that	the	time	is	not	right	 for	revolution,	but	‘a	patient	work	of	sowing’	must	be	undertaken	with	a	view	to	securing	a	better	future.	He	confides	that	‘before’	he	was	too	direct,	impulsive	and	reckless,	exposing	himself	to	risks	and	even	considering	death	as	a	possibility,	whereas	now	he	agrees	that	society	must	be	led	toward	change	through	the	patient	work	of	‘education’.	With	this	goal	in	mind,	he	matriculated	in	Political	Science	and	plans	to	apply	for	a	grant	offered	by	an	Islamist	organisation	 to	 complete	 his	 studies	 in	 Turkey.	 He	 aspires	 to	 become	 a	 university	 professor	 and	 to	 join	 the	professors’	union	in	order	to	bring	about	his	political	view	within	the	category.	He	qualifies	this	mission	as	a	form	of	jihād,	which,	he	observes,	‘cannot	be	only	directed	frontally	against	the	system’.	 Well	beyond	what	he	is	willing	to	admit,	Younes	–	not	unlike	Kamal	–	is	enacting	a	family	mandate,	assimilated	from	his	childhood	and	ratified	in	the	early	days	of	the	revolt	when	his	father	used	to	call	him	‘his	crown	prince’.	Nonetheless,	Younes	seems	to	have	exceeded	his	parents	in	terms	of	ideology	and	militancy,	turning	his	political	posture	into	a	life	choice,	a	movement	in	the	proper	sense	of	the	term	and	one	that	is	bound	to	last.	 
Similarly	 to	 Redwan,	 Sukaina,	 ‘Adil,	 Hayat,	 Mohammed	 and	 Kamal,	 for	 Younes	 the	 process	 of	 political	subjectivation	is	the	result	of	involvement	in	new	‘spaces	of	experience’	(Pleyers	and	Capitaine	2016),	a	series	of	situations	of	relational	learning	in	which	new	roles	and	forms	of	life	are	lived	out	and	gradually	appropriated.	Even	when	this	occurs	in	continuity	with	primary	socialisation,	it	is	also	a	process	of	personal	differentiation.	Ironically,	unawareness	of	causes	and	processes	is	a	sign	of	effectiveness	and	durability,	inasmuch	as	subjectivation	rests	also	on	forms	of	embodiment	that,	as	such,	are	not	immediately	reached	by	reasoning.	Through	the	enactment	and	rehearsal	of	these	new	forms	of	being-in-relation,	the	subjective	shift	is	consolidated	and	paves	the	way	to	new	choices.	 	A	structuring	utopia	and	an	unfinished	project	 In	the	introduction	to	his	famous	essay	on	hope	and	utopia,	Ernst	Bloch	claims	that	political	imagination	cannot	be	thought	of	without	considering	hope	as	an	orienting	sense.	For	Bloch,	‘hope	is	not	taken	only	as	emotion	[...]	but	more	essentially	as	a	directing	act	of	cognitive	kind’	(Bloch	1995,	12).	Due	to	its	capacity	to	prefigure	a	desirable	future,	 a	 ‘Not-Yet’,	 hope	 lays	 the	 foundations	 of	 utopia,	 ‘in	 the	 new	 tenable	 sense	 of	 the	 forward	 dream,	 of	anticipation	in	general’	(Bloch	1995,	12).	In	a	later	section	of	the	book,	he	defines	a	‘concrete	utopia’	as	the	attitude	to	connect	‘dreams	and	life’	within	a	‘Real-Possible’	(Bloch	1995,	145–146).	Rather	logically,	Bloch	observes	that	‘all	 freedom	movements	are	guided	by	utopian	aspirations’	 (Bloch	1995,	7).	 In	a	 later	essay,	written	again	by	straddling	philosophy	and	literature,	Bloch	defines	utopia	as	the	way	‘to	find	it,	to	find	the	right	thing,	for	which	it	is	worthy	to	live,	to	be	organised,	and	to	have	time’	(Bloch	2000,	3).	A	concrete	utopia	is	a	perspective	of	change	that	is	perceived	at	hand	and,	as	such,	is	apt	to	organise	hope	around	a	possible	future	and	give	a	direction	to	life,	a	way	of	pursuing	‘a	sense’	for	what	comes	and	for	what	one	wants	to	become.	Utopia	outlives	failure	and	keeps	alive	 hope	 by	 postponing	 its	 coming.	 Under	 adverse	 circumstances,	 deferment	 provides	 a	 powerful	 way	 of	enduring	the	present	by	anticipating	alternative	possibilities	and	making	everyday	life	liveable.	Most	likely,	every	human	being	needs	a	kind	of	utopian	project,	framed	either	by	religion,	politics	or	economy	(and	frequently	by	all	of	these	at	once).	Its	concreteness	rests	on	a	projection	that	is	rendered	plausible	by	putting	oneself	in	it,	that	is,	by	committing	personally	to	the	future.	 The	‘forward	dream’	is	often	shaped	as	a	compensatory	image	of	the	present,	an	overturning	of	the	traits	of	one’s	own	 perceived	 condition,	 a	 ‘revolution’	 in	 the	 literal	 sense	 of	 the	 term.	 Now,	 our	 interlocutors	 in	 Morocco	recurrently	 qualify	 their	 social	 experience	 through	 notions	 like	 tkarfīs	 (suffering),	 fasād	 (corruption,	prevarication),	hogra	(abuse	and	humiliation),	iħbaţ	(frustration),	żulm	(injustice)	and	‘unf	(violence).	Such	terms,	redundantly	employed	to	describe	the	sense	of	 inequity	in	everyday	life,	remind	us	of	the	words	of	those	who	aspire	to	emigrate	(Elliot	2016;	Menin	2016;	Vacchiano	2018a,	2018b).	They	describe	the	perceived	imbalance	between	aspirations	and	possibilities	and	the	lack	of	conditions	(żuruf)	that	qualify	as	‘a	decent	life’	(‘aysh	karīm)	in	today’s	world.	Significantly,	the	most	renowned	slogans	chanted	across	the	Arab	streets	in	2011,	and	readapted	by	the	Movement	in	Morocco,	echoed	almost	symmetrically	these	feelings.	 The	famous	keywords	 ‘karāma,	ħurriya,	 ‘adāla	ijtima‘iyya’	(dignity,	 freedom	and	social	 justice)	were	uttered	in	slogans	 and	 chants	 that	 were	 effective	 in	 breaking	 with	 individual	 helplessness	 and	 encompassing	 different	sensitivities.	For	our	interlocutors,	‘dignity’	is	a	specific	reference	to	personal	value,	respect	and	well-being	(as	in	the	expression	 ‘aysh	karīm,	 ‘decent	 life’);	 ‘freedom’	 is	a	 claim	 for	 self-determination	against	 state	 control	over	political	 opinions	 and	 collective	 morality;	 ‘social	 justice’	 refers	 to	 the	 inversion	 of	 social	 imbalances	 and	summarises	a	fairer	society	at	large.	Indeed,	these	notions	are	sufficiently	ambiguous	to	create	a	semantic	space	of	recognition	in	which	one’s	experience	can	be	projected:	everybody	is	free	to	find	a	personal	way	of	positioning	themselves,	and	eventually	–	as	in	‘Adil’s	case	–	may	be	surprised	by	recognising	their	feelings	are	shared	by	other	people.	The	efficacy	of	such	claims	seems	to	exceed	circumstances	and	bear	long-lasting	effects.	For	many	of	those	who	decided	‘to	say	no’	(an	expression	used	by	Bloch	but	also	commonly	employed	in	many	Arab	countries:	see	also	 Schielke	 2015),	 they	 turned	 into	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘structuring	 utopia’,	 one	which	 shaped	 personal	 lifegoals	 and	showed	a	way	forward.	 Redwan	is	now	an	active	member	of	a	recently	established	Moroccan	NGO	for	research	and	consultancy	in	the	area	of	 social	 participation.	 His	 movement	 from	 mild	 curiosity	 to	 involvement	 has	 allowed	 him	 to	 increase	 his	awareness	 of	 social	 imbalances	 and	 to	 gain	 self-confidence	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 initiative.	 He	 believes	 that	 the	 20	February	Movement	had	broad	ambitions	in	terms	of	social	and	political	change	and	that	its	tangible	achievements	have	been	limited.	Yet,	he	considers	that	the	principle	that	people	can	rise	and	claim	their	rights	was	affirmed	once	and	for	all.	He	keeps	on	hoping	for	a	better	society	and	feels	satisfied	with	working	actively	to	pursue	it.	Today,	Sukaina	works	for	an	international	NGO	and	militates	in	the	same	left-wing	party	to	which	she	drew	close	before	the	revolt.	For	her,	the	militancy	within	the	Movement	has	been	‘one	of	the	best	experiences	in	life’,	and	with	the	Movement	she	feels	she	has	lived	out	freedom	and	deep	friendship.	Whenever	she	listens	to	the	slogans	chanted	in	demonstrations,	she	recognises	the	words	that	the	young	people	of	the	Movement	imagined	and	wrote.	She	
married	a	comrade	from	the	Movement	and,	although	her	parents	are	still	deferential	toward	‘the	system’,	they	have	been	gradually	drawn	closer	to	her	political	views.	‘Adil	has	undertaken	studies	in	Law	and	aims	to	become	a	 lawyer	working	with	political	detainees.	He	 is	currently	an	activist	 for	 the	Moroccan	Association	 for	Human	Rights	and	sees	his	engagement	as	the	unequivocal	continuation	of	his	2011	militancy.	Admittedly,	he	chose	to	study	Law	because	the	debates	within	the	Movement	demanded	‘a	deep	knowledge	of	law	or	social	sciences’,	and	because	the	majority	of	the	young	people	who	influenced	his	views	were	students	in	Law.	Hayat	married	an	active	member	 of	 Al-‘Adl	wa	 al-Ihsān,	 although	 the	 intensity	 of	 her	militancy	 is	 still	 fluctuating.	Mohammed	 is	 also	enrolled	 in	 a	MA	programme	 in	Law	and	works	 as	 a	 volunteer	 in	 the	 same	NGO	as	Redwan.	He	 convincingly	maintains	that	‘20	Febrair	madrasa’	(‘20	February	is	a	school’),	an	experience	that	‘generated	a	big	metamorphosis’	and	 that	motivated	 him	 ‘to	 study	 to	 understand	 things’.	 For	 his	 part,	 Kamal	 is	 now	 employed	 as	 a	 computer	technician	in	a	state-owned	company.	During	his	militancy,	he	came	to	understand	the	power	of	new	media,	and	turned	information	technology	into	his	job.	Although	he	estimates	that	things	have	not	significantly	changed,	he	is	convinced	 that	 the	Movement	 has	 opened	new	avenues	by	 giving	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 act	 of	 protesting.	 For	 this	reason,	since	‘many	people	still	have	nothing	to	lose’,	a	new	uprising	is	likely	to	occur	in	the	future.	If	and	when	it	does,	he	plans	to	make	himself	useful	by	transmitting	his	technical	skills	to	‘a	new	generation	of	activists’.	As	for	Younes,	his	plan	is	laid	out	clearly:	he	sees	his	ambition	to	become	a	professor	in	political	science	as	a	personal	jihad	(literally:	‘an	effort’)	that	will	enable	him	to	pursue	his	‘educational’	programme	toward	a	society	informed	by	Islamic	principles.	 Other	20	February	activists	also	undertook	studies	in	social	sciences	and	philosophy,	and	today	work	in	NGOs	or	human	 rights	 organisations	 or	 have	 joined	 political	 parties.	 Some	 met	 their	 current	 partners	 through	 their	activism,	and	almost	all	 redefined	 their	personal	 roles	and	duties	with	regard	 to	 the	 family.	Thus,	an	 intimate	revolution	accompanied	the	public	engagement	of	2011	and	beyond.	Political	subjectivation	has	both	public	and	intimate	stakes,	although	the	political	significance	of	each	is	not	always	the	same.	 The	transition	from	‘uprising’	to	‘activism’	is	a	passage	from	the	quick	eruption	of	subversive	passion	and	collective	effervescence	to	the	strategic	essentialism	of	a	patient,	often	interstitial,	daily	struggle	for	spaces	of	movement	within	the	meshes	of	hegemony.	Taking	inspiration	from	Turner	again,	 it	 is	a	move	between	 ‘communitas’	and	‘structure’,	a	‘social	drama’	in	which	breach	and	crisis	necessarily	give	way	to	redress	and	reintegration	(Turner	1969,	1988;	Thomassen	2012).	Revolution	is	temporary	by	definition.	In	the	experience	of	our	interlocutors,	the	return	to	the	ordinariness	of	the	‘cold	time’	is	well	represented	by	the	shift	from	‘justice’	to	‘law’.	Stepping	from	
‘adl	to	ħaqq	is	doubtless	a	normalisation	of	the	struggle	and	its	insertion	into	a	domain	of	action	supervised	by	the	ruling	power.	Yet,	it	is	also	a	way	to	preserve	the	value	of	the	‘concrete	utopia’	under	other	circumstances,	keeping	hope	alive,	carving	out	conditional	spaces	of	possibility	in	the	present	and	postponing	its	full	accomplishment	to	the	future.	Protracted	activism	in	a	regime	of	ordinariness	needs	utopia	in	order	to	hold	a	direction.	Add	to	this,	in	a	largely	authoritarian	state,	evoking	human	rights	(al-huqūq	al-insān)	and	the	rule	of	law	is	to	resort	to	a	language	that	allows	one	to	convey	again,	to	different	audiences,	the	call	for	dignity,	freedom	and	social	justice.		
 Conclusions:	to	be	disidentified	with	power	 In	an	insightful	pamphlet	written	‘on	the	spot’	in	the	Spring	of	2011	(Benslama	2011),	the	Tunisian	psychoanalyst	Fethi	Benslama	questioned	the	‘flagrant’	(éclatants)	events	of	his	country	in	order	to	understand	how	it	was	that	something	 deemed	 simply	 inconceivable	 a	 few	months	 ago	 –	 nothing	 less	 than	 a	 revolution	 –	 had	 ‘suddenly’	become	possible.	His	 reflection	hinges	on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 self-immolation	of	Tāriq	Muhammad	Al-Bou	 ‘Azizi	provoked,	in	the	minds	of	his	fellow	citizens,	a	spark	without	previous	references,	a	process	of	radical	rupture	above	all	with	themselves:	‘a	new	perception,	[...]	a	sudden	breaking	of	meaning,	a	[...]	dazzling	desire	that	sets	in	motion	passion,	language,	representation’	(Benslama	2011,	16).	For	Benslama,	this	‘ejection’,	this	displacement	that	takes	one	‘out	of	oneself’,	enabled	a	psychic	separation	from	the	structures	of	subjection	and	generated	a	new	collective	identification,	on	one	side	with	the	martyr	and	on	the	other	side	with	‘the	people’.	For	Benslama,	this	subjectivation,	 occurring	 in	 circumstances	 where	 ‘chance	 meets	 necessity’	 (Benslama	 2011,	 33),	 is	 achieved	through	a	powerful	emotional	movement	that	breaks	the	consolidated	structures	of	the	imaginary	and	opens	up	unexpected,	potentially	revolutionary,	configurations.	 It	seems	to	us	that	this	movement	of	‘swerve’	(Rancière	calls	it	‘écart’)	is	the	condition	of	possibility	for	an	ethical	break	that	consents	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	the	ruling	power	and	the	resulting	‘voluntary	servitude’.	In	order	to	 be	 properly	 political,	 however,	 this	 change	 of	 direction	 needs	 to	 be	 ratified	 and	 shared	 in	 a	 collective	environment,	 becoming	 a	 plausible	 project,	 a	 ‘concrete	 utopia’,	 also	 for	 others.	 Only	 a	 form	 of	 collective	organisation	–	a	party,	a	group	or,	under	very	specific	conditions,	a	‘multitude’	–	can	authorise	and	make	effective	the	passage	from	daily	malaise,	when	people	resist	injustice,	to	hope	in	a	revolution.	 In	analysing	this	shift,	we	found	a	very	specific	combination	of	personal	dispositions,	historical	circumstances,	forms	of	collective	identification	and	organised	thought.	The	20	February	Movement	in	Morocco	represented	the	
coalescence	of	these	factors	and	became	an	environment	in	which	individual	sensitivity	could	be	turned	into	an	organised	project.	It	was,	at	the	same	time,	both	a	trigger	for	personal	change	and	a	result	of	it.	Our	interlocutors	recount	this	moment	in	their	lives	as	a	fundamental	passage,	an	existential	turning	point	that	ended	up	influencing	their	subsequent	choices.	In	this	sense,	the	comparison	with	the	ritual	process	is	striking.	This	shows	us	that,	even	if	 it	 is	 carried	out	 in	very	specific	 circumstances,	 the	act	of	 ‘problematization’	has	consequences	 that	 last	well	beyond	 the	moment	of	 its	emergence:	 ‘breakdown’,	 in	 this	 case,	did	not	 seem	 to	give	way	 to	 the	 return	 to	an	unreflected	everyday	condition.	Like	any	significant	experience,	political	subjectivation	prompt	a	metamorphosis	in	the	way	in	which	the	individuals	position	themselves	with	respect	to	the	world.	Yet,	perhaps	unlike	any	other	experience,	 it	produces	also	a	discourse	on	 the	world	and	a	reflection	on	 the	posture	one	assumes	personally	towards	the	power	which	is	fostered	by	a	shared,	structuring	utopia.	Therefore,	even	though	the	revolt	has	not	kept	all	its	promises,	at	least	some	of	its	changes	have	come	to	stay.	For	many	of	its	protagonists,	the	Spring	has	not	exhausted	its	potentialities	and	‘the	long	2011’	is	still	running.	 	Notes	 1. Fundação	para	a	Ciência	e	a	Tecnologia	(FCT),	IF/01002/2014/CP1239/CT0003.		2. Al-Wası̄ŧ	min	ajli	ad-Dimukratiyya	wa	Huqūq	al-Insān	(The	Mediator	for	Democracy	and	Human	Rights),	Haraka	20	
Fibrāir.	Muĥawala	fi	At-Tawthīqi	(The	20	February	Movement.	An	Attempt	of	Documentation),	Rabat,	2015.		3. For	an	exposition	of	convergences	and	divergences	in	considering	subjectivity	in	anthropology	and	psychoanalysis,	see	Moore	(2007).		4. On	the	cyclical	swing	of	‘cold’	and	‘hot’	periods	in	Morocco	see	Bennani-Chraı̈bi	(1994).		5. Literally:	‘storehouse’.	It	is	the	term	that	designates	the	authority	and	its	agents	in	Morocco,	alluding	to	the	buildings	where	in-kind	tributes	were	stored	in	the	past.		6. The	vernacular	term,	common	in	the	whole	Maghreb	and	recently	extended	to	other	Arab	countries,	used	to	refer	to	the	humiliation,	abuse	and	prevarication	committed	by	the	authorities.			Acknowledgements	 We	wish	to	thank	all	our	interlocutors	in	Morocco,	who	gave	a	fundamental	contribution	to	this	study.	This	article	is	dedicated	to	Mourad	Lamkhantar.	 	Funding	 This	research	is	supported	by	national	funds	provided	by	the	Fundação	para	a	Ciência	e	a	Tecnologia	(FCT)	of	the	Portuguese	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology,	in	the	framework	of	the	exploratory	project	IF/01002/2014/CP1239/CT0003.	 	References	 Abdelrahman,	Maha.	2011.	“The	Transnational	and	the	Local:	Egyptian	Activists	and	Transnational	Protest	Networks.”	British	
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